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ARTICLES
ARGENTINA'S EMERGING STANDARD OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE UNDERLYING CONFLICTS
BETWEEN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, TRIPS STANDARDS, AND THE
UNITED STATES

Kimberly A.Czub*
INTRODUCTION

In 1994, members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) signed
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) that provides minimum standards for national legislation regarding
intellectual property rights. The TRIPS Agreement is significant because
it establishes intellectual property (IP) standards far above the national laws
of many developing countries. Since many countries did not have an
existing system to protect IPrights2 , developing countries were given extra
time to establish laws reflecting the standards of the TRIPS Agreement.
The first deadline for developing countries to implement national
legislation was January 1, 2000W and there is significant controversy
surrounding the efforts of many developing countries to implement TRIPS
standards. One of the most controversial areas of IP protection involves
pharmaceutical patents, an area in which the United States has had
considerable difficulty with its trading partners.5
* B.A., (Economics), American University, 1995; J.D., Case Western University School
of Law, 2001. Executive Topic Development Editor, Case Western Reserve Journal of
InternationalLaw. The author would like to thank her parents and Garrett Nagle for their
love, support and encouragement during the student note process and throughout law school.
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2 See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 107 (2000).
3 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 65.
4 An additional five years was granted with respect to pharmaceutical patents. See id.

5 TRIPS patent disputes initiated by the United States have resulted in two DSU
decisions and numerous consultations in the WTO. See Snapshot of WTO Cases Involving
the United States (last modified Feb. 8, 2001), at http://www.ustr.gov
enforcementlsnapshot.html.
The issue of pharmaceutical patent protection has been
especially contentious between the United States and Argentina. See Travis Lea, Argentina
and the United States Clash Over Drug Sales at the WTO (Jan. 8, 2001) (noting
"Pharmaceutical patent protection has been one of the most important trade issues of the past
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Argentina is an important country to study pharmaceutical patent
enforcement because Argentine manufacturers copy about $500 million
annually from multinational companies 6 and because Argentina is one of
the few countries to have consistently resisted U.S. pressure to reform its
pharmaceutical patent laws. Although Argentina's resistance may provide
examples to other developing countries, the greatest impact of the feud over
patent protection will be found in regional trade agreements. 7 Since the
formation of the TRIPS Agreement, the United States has sought to
increase patent protection in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres
through other agreements such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
(FTAA).8 Argentina's resistance may have a negative effect on other
decade
between
the
United
States
and
Argentina."),
at
http://www.inthesetimes.conweb2503/lea2503.html.
The tension between the United
States and Argentina has been fueled by the United States pharmaceutical industry which
has labeled Argentina as a "stand out in [its]refusal to adopt adequate and effective patent
protection for pharmaceutical products".
Glenn Hess, PhRMA Calls for Tougher
Enforcement of Trade Regulations, CHEMICAL MARKETING REPORTER, Mar. 6, 2000,
availableat Westlaw, 2000 WL 9382329.
6 See Craig Torres, Argentina Is Tricky Groundfor U.S. Drug Makers: Lax Enforcement
of Treaty Causes a Loss of Sales, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1999, at A13.
7 The United States pharmaceutical industry was never entirely satisfied with the level
of protection TRIPS provided. Consequently, the United States has sought to increase IP
standards beyond TRIPS in regional trade agreements. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association stated that "it is our understanding that the United States will continue to use
strong bilateral negotiations to achieve NAFTA standards of protection." See Drug Firms
Back GATT Accord Providedthe United States PursueFurtherBilateralNegotiations,PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Jan. 25, 1994), available in LEXIS, Patent
Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file. NAFTA is regarded as having some of the
strongest IP protections in the world. See Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property
Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of Systems in Eighteen Developing
Countries, 37 IDEA 261, 343-44 (1997). The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas is not
yet complete but the United States is pressing for standards of IP protection beyond those
found in the TRIPS Agreement. See US Firms to Push for More IP Rights Protection in
WTO, FTAA Talks, AM. TRADE, Aug. 6, 1998, at 24 (stating the United States wants to
strengthen TRIPS provisions in the FTAA negotiations to achieve a WTO plus level of
protection).
8 One way the US would like to strengthen intellectual property standards in the
Americas is through the FTAA. See FTAA Negotiating Group on Intellectual Property:
Public
Summary
of
US
Position
(visited
Jan.
20,
2001),
http://www.USTR.gov/regions/whemisphere/intel.html. Thus far, Argentina and other Latin
American Countries have resisted increased regional standards of protection. See Papovich:
IP Rights Provisions in FTAA Should Not Be Limited to TRIPS, AM. TRADE, July 23, 1998,
at 5 (noting that Joseph Papovich, the Assistant US Trade Representative for Services and
Intellectual Property, said "demands by some Latin American countries that the FTAA
should not go beyond the TRIPS Agreement are a 'waste of time."').
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signatories to these9 agreements and other Latin American trade agreements
such as Mercosur.
A case study of Argentina's patent problems reveals many of the
variables that comprise effective enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement.
First, this Note will explain the history of the current dispute and the U.S.
attempts to compel patent protection. Next, an assessment of the benefits
and harms of strengthening IP rights to the levels favored by the United
States will be examined. Finally, the effect of external and internal
impediments to strengthening IP rights in Argentina and prospects for
change in the future will be assessed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Path to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
1. Pre-TRIPS Negotiations
The current patent rights dispute in Argentina is over fifteen years
old and the WTO consultations are the latest attempt of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) to strengthen IP protection in Argentina.
While the WTO consultations between the United States and Argentina
progress, it is easy to forget that the current controversy is not limited to
global intellectual property rights, but to domestic international trade
concerns as well. The 1974 Trade Act included a provision under Section
301 by which private parties may obtain the intervention of the United
States against foreign trade practices that unfairly limit US commerce.101
Remedies for infractions are not limited to a particular trade agreement;
rather, the USTR has broad discretion to impose a range of remedies
including trade sanctions.1 2 Two mechanisms, Special 301 and Super 301,
list procedures identifying countries with unfair trade practices. 3 The first
step in a Super 301 investigation is the preparation of a National Trade
Estimate Report.14 During 1985-1987, the USTR published several
9 The Mercosur Agreement was supposed to lead to coordination of IP rights in South
America by December of 1994, but no new provisions regarding such protection have been
added to the agreement as of this date. See MercosurAgreement Should Lead to Harmonized
Industrial Property Laws, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Sept. 16,
1991), availablein LEXIS, Patent Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file.
10 Trade Act of 1974 §§ 301, 182, as amended by 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412(a)(1),
2242(a)(1)(B).
1 See EDWARD SLAVKO YAMBRUSIC, TRADE BASED APPROACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 29 (1992).
12 See id. at 30.
'3

See id. at 189.

14 See id.
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National Trade Estimate Reports that examined Argentina's 1864 Patent
Law and the country's IP rights structure.' 5 The chief problem with the6
1864 law was that it excluded pharmaceuticals from patent protection.'
Argentina was not the only country targeted for IP reforms; the United
States also criticized the patent laws of countries all over the world. 17 On
September 27, 1988, the United States launched a Section 301 investigation
of Argentine patent protection and consultations with the Argentine
government followed."
Serious change within Argentina's IP regime did not occur until
1989 when Carlos Saul Menem came to power and pledged to reform
Argentina's patent laws. 19 President Menem promised to send legislation to
the Argentine Congress to provide patent protection of pharmaceuticals, but
legislation was not presented to the Argentine Congress until 1991.20 The
original bill provided for patent pipeline protection and severely restricted
compulsory licensing provisions. These provisions have been consistently
and strongly endorsed by the United States in negotiations with developing
countries throughout the world.2' The bill was not passed immediately and
lost most of its momentum in March of 1993 when the House Committee
on Industry decided not to debate the patent bill until the Uruguay Round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations was
concluded. 22 While the bill was stalled, Carlos Menem still signed
15 See The Path to Patent Law As Taken by Argentina, MARKETLETTER, Jan. 29, 1996,
availableat Westlaw, 1996 WL 8314654 [hereinafter The Path to Patent Law].
16 See id.
'"

See id.

18 See Initiation of Section 301 Investigation: Argentina's Failure to Provide Adequate
and Effective Intellectual Property Protection for Pharmaceuticals, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,668
(Sept. 27, 1988). The investigation was launched in response to a petition by the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) on August 10, 1988, citing Argentina's
lax IP protection. See id.
19 See The Path to Patent Law, supra note 15.
20 The PMA withdrew its request for an investigation before consultations with
Argentina regarding pharmaceutical patent protection. See USTR, Citing Argentina's
'Progress,' Announces Withdrawal of PMA Petition, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
DAILY (BNA), (Oct. 18, 1989), available in LEXIS, Patent Law Treatises & Analytical
Materials file.
21 See Antonio Mill & Estudio Mill, Patent Law Would Be Modernized by Draft Bills

Now Before Congress, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (May 19, 1992),
availablein LEXIS, Patent Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file.
22 See Analysts Debate Intention of New PharmaceuticalDecree, PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (May 27, 1993), available in LEXIS, Patent Law Treatises &

Analytical Materials file [hereinafter Analysts Debate]. See also Opposition Keeps Patent
Law on Hold Until Conclusion of Uruguay Round, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
DAILY (BNA), (Aug. 7, 1992), available in LEXIS, Patent Law Treatises & Analytical
Materials file, (noting that the draft legislation under debate contains several provisions,
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Executive Decree 177 amending various aspects of the existing patent
law.3 The decree was viewed in Argentina as a compromise, but the

contents of the decree did not enact significant pharmaceutical patent
protection. Instead, the decree addressed labeling of pharmaceuticals and
importation of pharmaceutical products. 24 The United States was not
pleased with the delay and placed Argentina on the Special 301 Priority

watch list in April of 1993.5 The patent bill finally made it to the Senate in
May, and in December the GAT negotiations were continued. 26 On June

30, 1994, Argentina was on the watch list again.27
2. Post-TRIPS Negotiations

On November 17, 1994, the Senate finally passed a patent
protection bill that was a mixture of approaches from various political
parties. Unfortunately, the protections contained in the original bill were
not provided for in this new bill.m In December of 1994, the Senate
proposed amendments to the original bill and did not include pipeline
protection or compulsory licensing.2 9 The United States felt the provisions

were not up to par with TRIPS or GATT. 30 In January of 1995, Law 24,425
was published which ratified the WTO and TRIPS. 31 After the treaties were
ratified, President Menem clarified that any inconsistencies in the pending

including compulsory licensing that may be illegal if certain proposals in the Uruguay round
are successful). Compulsory licensing was later incorporated into TRIPS. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 31.
23 See Analysts Debate, supra note 22.
24

See id.

25 See USTR Names Brazil, India, Thailand "Special 301" Priority Countries, PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (May 11, 1993), available in LEXIS, Patent
Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file.
26 See Argentine Senate Approves Patent Protection Bill, PAT. TRADEMARK &

COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Nov. 29, 1994), available in LEXIS, Patent Law Treatises &
Analytical Materials file [hereinafter Argentine Senate].
27 See USTR Notice, Identification of Foreign Countries That Deny Adequate and
Effective Intellectual Property Protection or Market Access to Persons That Rely on
IntellectualProperty Protection,59 Fed. Reg. 26341 (1994).
See Argentine Senate, supra note 26.
See GATT Treaty Would Have Precedence Over Argentine Patent Law, DiTella Says,
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Mar. 23, 1995), available in LEXIS,
Patent Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file.
30 See Menem to Modify Argentine Patent Bill in Wake of United States and European
2

29

Criticism, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Apr. 21, 1995), available in
LEXIS, Patent Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file.
31 See id.
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legislation would be decided in favor of the TRIPS provisions.32 In March
of 1995, the Argentine House passed Law 24,481 that called for an eightyear transition for pharmaceutical protection.3 3 President Menem vetoed
this bill and introduced the provisions of GATT (Decree 548/95). 34 Later,
in December of 1995 to make it
Article 50 of Law 24,572 was modified
35
easier to keep compulsory licenses.
In 1995, President Menem issued regulatory decree 621/95 on the
application of international treaties.36 Pharmaceutical patent protection
would be granted as of January 1, 1996, and the form of patent revalidation
was included. However, most of the provisions of the presidential decree
were overturned and Law 24,481 was passed.37 The patent law is in force,
but the corrective measures have made some of the provisions unclear.3 8 On
March 22, 1996 Menem signed legislation that provided for a five-year
transition period for patent protection and established a framework for
compulsory licensing. 9 Concurrent with the legislation, the Executive
Branch also issued Decree 260/96, replacing Decree 590/5 that had been
overturned earlier by Congress. The decree contained a number of
clarifications and interpretations about the evolving patent act. The new
law was not entirely satisfactory to the United States and they urged
Menem to reopen debate on such issues as data secrecy and compulsory
licensing. 4° Negotiations continued and by December a supplementary law
was issued. On December 18, 1996, the Argentine Congress passed Law
24,766 that "mirrors" TRIPS and permits innovator's competitors to use the
innovator's test data already in the public domain, and eliminated a clause
that did not protect information for entities not previously registered in

32

See id.

33 See id.
34 See New Argentine Patent Regime Still Judged Subpar, US Executive Says, PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Apr. 4, 1996), available in LEXIS, Patent

Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file [hereinafter Argentine Patent Regime].
35 See id.
36 See id. See also Cavallo Says Executive Decree Will Implement GATT, TRIPS
Requirements, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Apr. 24, 1995), available
in LEXIS, Patent Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file.
37 See Argentine Patent Regime, supra note 34.
38 See Patent Law Enters Into Force; Corrective Measure's Status Remains Unclear,
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Nov. 2, 1995), available in LEXIS,

Patent Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file.
39 See Argentine Patent Regime, supra note 34.
40 See Menem Says He'll Try to Reopen Discussions On New Patent Law, PAT.

L. DAILY (BNA), (June 18, 1996), available in LEXIS, Patent
Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
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Argentina.41 In addition to pressing for concessions above the standards of
the TRIPS Agreement, the USTR threatened that if the law was not passed
by December 20, sanctions against Argentina would be enforced. Even
though the TRIPS Agreement protects new patent registrations, the United
States wanted protection for all products already within the Argentine
market.
3. Trade Retaliation by the United States
Regardless of Argentina's efforts during the transitional period, the
United States still brought trade sanctions against Argentina. In 1997, The
United States revoked GSP status for Argentine exports due to Argentina's
failure to enact stronger patent legislation 42 within Law 24,766. 41 While
U.S. sanctions have been successful with Argentina's largest trading partner
Brazil, 44 Argentina's economic and political structure is less supportive of a
strong IP rights regime.
In response to the trade sanctions, Argentine legislators threatened
a counterstroke that would extend its transition period under the TRIPS
Agreement for pharmaceutical products. Argentina originally volunteered
to comply within five years.45 The U.S. trade sanctions did not produce any
meaningful changes to Argentina's ,atent laws and Argentina remained on
the USTR watch list for 1997-1999.
Efforts by the United States to ascertain and promote TRIPS
compliance after the sanctions were initiated in the WTO during 1998 and
1999. For example, the United States requested that Argentina submit
answers to a WTO questionnaire regarding the implementation of Articles

41

See Lower House Approves Provision on Pharmaceutical Trade Secrets, PAT.

TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Nov. 29, 1994), available in LEXIS, Patent
Law Treatises & Analytical Materials file.
42 See USTR Notice, Generalized System of Preferences; Intellectual Property Rights;
Request for Public Comment on Products Affected by Partial Withdrawal of Argentina's
Benefits, 62 Fed. Reg. 3072-07 (Jan. 21, 1997) [hereinafter USTR Sanction Notice]. The
United States revoked GSP for 118 tariff lines or about half of the trade for which Argentina
has GSP Status. See US Listing of Goods to Lose GSP Benefits Spurs Anger in Argentina,
INsiDE NAFrA, Apr. 17, 1997, at 1, 30.
43 See USTR-Designate Barshefsky Announces GSP Sanctions Against Argentina for
Continuing IP Rights Problems, USTR Press Release, Jan. 15, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, News file.
44 See The Pathto Patent Law, supra note 15.
45 Kevin G. Hall, Tension Mounts in US- Argentine Spat Over Drug Patents, J.

COMMERCE, Dec. 10, 1997, at 1A.
46 See, e.g., USTR Sanction Notice, supra note 42.
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70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement. 47 Argentina complied with the
request and submitted answers on February 17, 1999.48 With the 2000
TRIPS deadlines looming, the United States turned to the WTO dispute
body to press its positions.
B. WTO Dispute Proceedings

1. The 1999 Consultations
The United States has initiated two sets of consultations with
Argentina in the WTO.
Concurrent with the USTR Special 301
proceedings in 1999, the USTR filed its first set of consultations with the
WTO regarding Argentina's protection of patent rights. 49 The first set of
consultations addressed Argentina's enforcement of restrictions on the
marketing of xharmaceuticals and protection of proprietary data for
agrochemicals.
Switzerland petitioned to be added to the consultations
later in the month.51 Although the WTO consultations are not a formal suit,
the United States has hinted that Argentina will be one of the first countries
to be subject to patent litigation under TRIPS after 2000.2
The two issues raised in the Complaint deal with the enforcement
and interpretation of Articles 70.9 and 39.3 of TRIPS. According to Article
70.9, Argentina is required to provide exclusive marketing rights (EMRs)
47 See Implementation of Articles 70.8 and 70.9: Responses by Argentina at Meeting of
Councilfor TRIPS held Mar. 12, 1999, (Document No. IP/CIW/135) (visited Mar. 1, 2001),
at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Argentine Response].
48 See id. Many other developing countries were asked to comply with these requests.

Unfortunately, the United States was not pleased with the progress and refused to identify
the steps it was taking to ensure the transfer of technology to developing countries as
required by TRIPS. See Daniel Pruzin, US and Developing Countries Feud Over
Intellectual Property Provisions,INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Dec. 8, 1998), available in
LEXIS, News Library, BNA file.
49 See USTR Notice, Identification of Countries That Deny Adequate Protection or
Market Access for Intellectual PropertyRights Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974,
64 Fed. Reg. 24438 (May 6, 1999).
50 See Argentina-Patent Protectionfor Pharmaceuticalsand Test Data Protectionfor
Agricultural Chemicals, Request for Consultations by the United States, (May 10, 1999), at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter U.S. 1999 Consultations].
51 See Argentina-Patent Protectionfor Pharmaceuticalsand Test Data Protectionfor
Agricultural Chemicals, Request to Join Consultations by Switzerland, (May 26, 1999), at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Switzerland 1999 Consultations].
52 See Corbett B. Daly, United States Threatens Argentina with Suit Under the TRIPS
Agreement, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Oct. 18, 1999), availablein LEXIS, News Library,
BNA file. See also Daniel Pruzin, WTO PostponesSeattle Post-Mortem, PAT. TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (DEC. 20, 1999), available in LEXIS, News Library, BNA
file.
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for pharmaceuticals since it does not have to provide patent protection until
2000. 5 3 However, the United States has complained that this provision is
not enforced in Argentine courts. 4 Secondly, the United States contends
that Argentina's practices violate Article 39.3 of TRIPS by enacting
legislation that fails to protect confidential test data for agricultural
chemical products for U.S. companies seeking patents.5 5 The consultations
were held on June 15, 1999 and July 27, 1999, but the countries have not
resolved their differences.5 6
2. The 2000 Consultations
The 2000 consultations expanded the list of grievances against
Argentina and reflect the United States' displeasure with Argentine patent
administration and judicial enforcement. The expanded list of grievances
included complaints regarding: (1) improperly excluded subject matter from
patent protection; (2) lack of safeguards used to grant compulsory licenses;
(3) failure to provide preliminary injunctions to prevent patent
infringements; (4) improper limits of judicial authority to shift the burden
of proof in civil cases involving infringement of patent processes; (5)
impermissible limits on certain transitional patents to limit the exclusive
rights granted by these patents; and (6) lack of patentee rights to amend
their patent applications to claim the enhanced protections of TRIPS. 57
Consultations were held on July 17, 2000 and November 29, 2000, but they
did not lead to any significant changes in Argentina's patent laws. 8

53

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 70.9.

5 See specific examples of the U.S. charge that Argentine courts do not enforce EMRs
infra Section IV.
55 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 39.3.
56 See Office of the USTR, Dispute Settlement Update, (last modified Feb. 9, 2001), at
http'/www.ustr.gov/enforcement/high.html [hereinafter DisputeSettlement Update].

5 See WTO Consultations Regarding Argentina-Patent and Test Data Protection, 65
Fed. Reg. 36497 (June 8, 2000); See also CertainMeasures on the Protectionof Patentsand
Test Data, Request for Consultations by the United States, (June 6, 2000), at
U.S.
2000
[hereinafter
http.//docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/IP/d/22.DOC
Consultations]. The European Union and Switzerland later requested to join the
consultations initiated by the United States. See Request to Join Consultations:
Communicationsfrom the European Communities, Argentina-CertainMeasures on the
June 20, 2000), at
Protection of Patents and Test Data, (visited
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/196-2.DOC; See also Switzerland 1999
Consultations, supra note 51.
58 See Dispute Settlement Update, supra note 56.
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3. Effect of the Consultations On Argentina's IP Laws
The request for consultations by the United States has been viewed
as an excuse by the Argentine legislature to further curtail patent
protection. 59 After the announcement of the first set of consultations two
bills were introduced in the Argentine legislature; one seeking to extend the
patent transition period another five years and the other seeking to change
the existing patent law and require local production in exchange for a
patent.60 Neither measure is particularly novel or harsh, but the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry is alarmed because neither action is viewed as a
step forward. Argentina's actions have aggravated a contentious issue.61
However, Argentina does have the option of extending its transition period
under TRIPS Article 65.62 Moreover, the requirement of local production is
also not prohibited by TRIPS, and Argentina's main trading partner, Brazil,
has the same requirement in its patent law.63 Despite these facts, the USTR
has warned that further consultations with the USTR would result if either
law were passed. 64 Contrary to U.S. accusations of retaliation, several
Argentine legislators have asserted that the IP legislation was introduced to
protest agricultural subsidies.6 5
The consultations between the United States, Switzerland, the
European Union, and Argentina are just the latest chapter in a highly
polarized debate about IP protection in developing countries. While
industrialized nations counsel patience to developing countries and
emphasize the long term benefits of a strong IP regime, they often forget
that the benefits to their industries will surface in the long run as well due to
the changes developing countries must undergo to support strong IP rights.
However, just as the U.S. trade sanctions were merely a paper victory, it is
59 See Argentine Congress Holds Back On WTO Patent Compliance Delay, AM. TRADE,

June 17, 1999, at 3 [hereinafter Argentine Congress Holds Back].
60 See id.
61 See US Attacks Argentine Proposal to Delay WTO Patent Compliance, AM. TRADE,
June 3, 1999, at 3-5 [hereinafter WTO Patent Compliance].
62 See The Path to Patent Law, supra note 15.
63 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT: Investing, Licensing and Trading in Argentina 19
(1999).
64 See id.
65 See WTO Patent Compliance, supra note 61.
66

While US sanctions enacted in response to Argentina's inadequate patent laws may

have hurt Argentina economically, both the sanctions and the threat of sanctions created a
political backlash that made the legislature more hostile to immediate patent reform. See
Argentine Government Said Working on Compromise Patent Legislation, PAT. TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA) (Jan. 17, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, BNA
file, (noting threat of sanctions had opposite effect of "giving rise to nationalist arguments in
certain sectors"); See also Latin American Firms Condemn US Pressure, MARKETLETTER,
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likely that a decision by the WTO in favor of the United States will have
limited short-term results as well.
II. ISSUES SURROUNDING THE IP PROTECTION DEBATE

A. ConsumerDrug Prices
One of the largest concerns of developing countries is the effect of
a patent system on pharmaceutical prices. Many developing countries feel
that the exclusive rights conferred by a patent will lead to higher prices for
consumers. Such a fear is especially relevant to the Argentine market for
medicines. On a per capita basis, Argentina's consumer spending on
pharmaceuticals rose from $113 to $191 between 1991 and 1995 as
compared to Brazil's increase during the same period from $33 to $62.
This is a significant difference67 given the respective population differences
of 34 million and 159 million.
Consumer prices for medicines have always been a large concern
with the TRIPS Agreement; several studies were done in Argentina that
showed significant price increases (71%) and decline in consumption (50%)
when a monopoly follows a competitive situation.68 Price increases were
predicted in India and other developing countries in the Far East as well.69
The charge that consumer prices will increase has been one of the
more appealing defenses of the Argentine pharmaceutical companies, but
other developing countries have been equally concerned with price
increases.70 The World Health Organization (WHO) has also published a
report, widely criticized by the pharmaceutical industry, arguing that patent
rights should be balanced with affordable access to pharmaceuticals in
developing countries. 71 Still there is a perception among Argentine citizens
that the socioeconomic costs of IP rights would be too great.72 One study
claimed that the average price charged to consumers by Latin American
pharmaceuticals for pirated products is 56% lower than the price charged
Aug. 3, 1998, (stating "while the Latin American drug industry is perfectly prepared to pay
royalties to multinationals to market their medicines, it is not prepared to meet all the
prerequisites that are being laid down by the 'all powerful North'), available in WL, GaleNews database, ISSN: 0951-3175.
67 See Mercosurand the PharmaceuticalIndustry-Waitingfor a Common Patent Regime,
LATIN AM. L. AND Bus. REP., Apr. 30, 1997, at 23, 25 [hereinafter Common PatentRegime].
68 See United Nations Conference on Trade & Development: The TRIPS Agreement and
Developing Countries, Annex 1, at 62, UNCTAD/ITE/1 (1996).
69 See Common Patent Regime, supra note 67.
70

Id.

7, See Id.
72

See Id.
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for the patented product in the United States.73 Before the TRIPS
Agreement was even signed, the Argentine pharmaceutical industry ran a
full-page advertisement in The New York Times comparing drug prices in
the United States and Argentina. 74 The advertisement claimed, for
example, that a popular anti-ulcer drug patented in the United States cost
$55.15 while the price in Argentina was $19.63. A larger gap occurred in
the price of an anti-arthritis drug where the
75 price in the United States was
$169.84 compared to $35.08 in Argentina.
Of course, there have been differing views about the problem of
price increases in industrialized countries. Several studies conducted by the
U.S. pharmaceutical industry have shown that consumers in Argentina
actually pay more in relative dollars for their medicines without strong
patent protection, while the Argentine pharmaceutical industry becomes
richer and richer.
Despite these charges regarding the Argentine
pharmaceutical industry and other local industries, there is still a perception
that they are the best equipped to meet the health demands of their countries
and will get the products that consumers need quicker and cheaper than the
western countries. The entire process becomes a vicious cycle because,
while the Argentine labs procure the medicines the market needs, there is
little incentive for countries like the United States to introduce their latest
technology into Argentina, which in turn inspires more copies of products
that are not available in the Argentine market.
B. ForeignInvestment
Stringent IP laws are viewed as a magnet for foreign investment
and increased foreign investment has been used as an incentive for
developing countries to strengthen their laws. A comparison of Brazil and
Argentina illustrates this phenomenon. Brazil passed its industrial property
law on May 14, 1996; the law went into effect in 1997.76 The new law is
being hailed as a magnet for foreign investment. For example, a US
pharmaceutical manufacturer claims that Brazil and Mexico received over
$2 billion dollars in new investment by pharmaceutical companies within
the first 18 months of enacting US supported patent laws.77
Foreign investment is crucial to long-term economic growth.
Whether such investment in competitor nations is hurting Argentina is
73

id.

74 See Drug Makers, PMA Trade Jabs Over PharmaceuticalPatent Protection, PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Dec. 10, 1990), available in LEXIS, News

Library, BNA file.
71 See id.
76 See Latin America: Brazil Is Booming, Argentina and the Rest Lag Behind, MED AD
NEWS, May 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Brazil Is Booming].
77 See Hall, supra note 45.
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subject to debate. An Argentine official notes that Argentina has seen the
return of ten multinational pharmaceutical companies and has attracted $1.5
million in investment during the time other countries were strengthening
their patent laws. Prior to TRIPS, the U.S. share of the pharmaceutical
industry fell in Argentina from 25% in 1984 to 14% in 1985 in part due to
piracy. Many of the companies that have returned to Argentina use it as
an export base for the rest of the Mercosur trading bloc that includes
Brazil 9 While these gains may be attributed to the promise of patent
protection, certainly no companies have left Argentina because of the
current events and there is evidence that more investment is pouring in
despite the lack of 'TRIPS-plus" or U.S. levels of protection.80
Furthermore, although the promise of foreign investment is used as
a "lure" to increase IP rights, the siphoned investment that is now going to
Brazil or Mexico is not necessarily connected to the strength of those laws.
For example, Brazil's patent law contains a provision that requires domestic
production of pharmaceutical products. Argentina's response to the foreign
investment flowing into Brazil was to draft similar legislation requiring
home production rather than revising their IP law in its entirety.
As stated earlier, the strength of IP rights in Latin American is
linked to the amount and type of technology that is transferred by U.S.
firms to the region. Hence, even though countries may draw foreign
investment through home production requirements, the best type of
investment will occur with strong IP rights. Sixty-two percent of American
chemical and pharmaceutical firms felt that Argentina's IP laws were too
weak to allow the transfer of the latest and best technologies of those
companies.8 1 The United States is the primary force for lobbying for IP
rights in South America because they have the most to lose even if their
best and latest technology is not transferred to South America. Foreign
pharmaceutical firms have been aggressively buying local firms since the
implementation of TRIPS. 2 Argentina has the 11td largest pharmaceutical
market in the world with over $3 billion in annual revenue. 3 Because of
the influx of foreign buyouts the pharmaceutical sector is now highly
concentrated with the top ten pharmaceutical firms controlling 35% of the
78 See Glenn Hess, Administration Threatens to Punish Argentina for Intellectual

Pirating;Trade Sanctions Planned to Protest PharmaceuticalPiracy, CHEMICAL MARKET
REP., Jan. 27, 1997.
71 See id.
80 See id.
81 Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection,Direct Investment, and Technology
Transfer: Germany, Japan, and the United States, 10 International Finance Corporation
Discussion Paper 27 (World Bank, 1995).
82 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,supra note 63, at 18-19.
83 id.
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market's revenues. 84 Still, despite the threat of less investment, it is not
entirely clear that Argentina is lacking the latest pharmaceutical advances.
As stated above, Argentine firms have been known to enter medicines,
patented in the United States, into their market even though the United
States had no plans to market that product in Argentina. 8
III. ARGENTINEAN PATENT PROTECTION WILL REMAIN WEAK IN THE
IMMEDIATE FUTURE

It has been recognized that one of the stumbling blocks to IP
harmonization in developing countries is their historical conception and use
of IPrights.8 6 Although this fact is not particularly tangible or measurable,
it still is a characteristic of many developing countries and pervades the
judicial, political, and economic systems of many developing countries.
While this section explores the factual evidence of patent protection in
Argentina, it is important to remember that underlying conceptions or
knowledge about IP rights have a profound influence on many of the
actions of developing countries subsequent to the TRIPS Agreement
implementation deadlines of 2000.
The dispute between Argentina and the United States regarding
pharmaceutical patent protection illustrates that the TRIPS Agreement is
only a starting point for ensuring IP protection abroad. 7 While the TRIPS
Agreement is an important step in the harmonization of IP laws,

84

id.

85 See Torres, supra note 6 (noting that Merck's hypertension drug Rentic was launched

by a local pharmaceutical firm Roemmers SA before Merck could market the original
version in Argentina).
86 See CORREA, supra note 2, at 102 (noting differences between Western and South
American conception of IP Rights); See also Ruth Gana, Prospects for Developing
Countries Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 747 (1996)
("[D]eveloping countries' refusal to adhere to higher standards of intellectual property
protection cannot therefore, as is often the case, simply be explained as 'ignorant',
'backward' or conscious decisions to exploit the system... .refusals often represented
conscious policies to use the system to serve national interests, however those interests may
have been defined.").
87 TRIPS was not solely designed to protect the rights of patent holders. Carlos Correa
remarks, "The TRIPS Agreement has not adopted an 'absolutist' model of intellectual
property, but rather aims at balancing the various interests at stake. The purpose of the
TRIPS Agreement is not merely to confer strong protection to title-holders. It contains procompetitive rules.. .thus striking a proper balance between.. .interests." See Carlos M.
Correa, Harmonizationof Intellectual PropertyRights In Latin America: Is There Still Room
for Differentiation? 29 N.Y.U. J.INT'LtL. & PoL 109, 122-23 (1997).
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significantly for the holders of patents in the pharmaceutical sector,88 the
treaty only imposes minimum IP standards. 89 Since many of the developing
nations did not have IP regimes in place or had narrow IP laws in place
when TRIPS went into effect, there are large gaps in the level of protection
between nations despite the minimum standards required by TRIPS.90 Gaps
in IP protection between industrialized nations such as the United States
and developing countries such as Argentina have shaped the controversy
regarding pharmaceutical patent protection. 91 Since the gaps between
TRIPS standards and U.S. IP laws have worked to the disadvantage of the
American pharmaceutical industry, the USTR has made strong initiatives to
increase the level of IP protection in developing countries with wellestablished local industries.
TRIPS does not prohibit countries from legislating IP standards
beyond the provisions of the treaty. Countries may also elect to enter into
regional trade agreements requiring higher levels of IP protection. 92
However, under Article 1, more extensive IP protection cannot be forced
upon member countries. 93 It is not likely that these countries will increase
IP protection beyond TRIPS. According to Carlos Correa, TRIPS "has
been regarded by many developing countries as representing both the
minimum and the maximum limit of protection to be granted... [tihey
consider that the agreement also sets forth the upper limit of protection they
should confer in order to ensure a right balance between the producers and

88TRIPS patent obligations are numerous and detailed, and grant rights to patent holders
that did not exist in many countries before the Uruguay Round. See CORREA, supra note 2, at
120.
89 See J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Proceduresof the TRIPS Agreement,
37 VA.J. INT'L L. 335, 336-37 (1997) (cautioning dispute resolution panels of the WTO to
remember that TRIPS standards are "minimum standards").
90 See Correa, supra note 86, at 109-110. TRIPS eliminated the division between
countries which grant patents to the pharmaceutical industry and those that do not. See id.
Before TRIPS, fifty countries did not have laws extending patent protection to
pharmaceutical products. See id. at 117. See generally, Sherwood, supra note 7, (noting the
differences in the level of protection in relation to direct investment between the TRIPS
standards, United States standards, and NAFTA standards).
91 See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers: Global Competition Under
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & PoL'Y 11 (1997).
92 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 1. The provision explicitly states, "Members
may, but shall not be obliged to, implement their own domestic laws more extensive than the
protection required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the
provisions of this agreement."
93 Id.
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users of technology. 9 4 Higher levels of IP protection will
95 only occur if
certain external and internal forces are present in Argentina.
This section will first examine the limits of the TRIPS Agreement
to increase the level of patent protection in Argentina and Argentina's
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement itself. Next, the effectiveness of
external and internal mechanisms to increase intellectual property
protection in Argentina will be reviewed and compared to other developing
countries and other types of IP protection in Argentina. Finally, with the
advent of the year 2000 TRIPS compliance deadline, this section will
examine the options for both the United States and Argentina in the future.
A. Limitations of the TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS Agreement contains many provisions that may
encourage developing nations to diverge from the enhanced TRIPS levels
of IP protection supported by the United States.9 6 These provisions are the
cornerstone of the controversy between many developed and less developed
nations over TRIPS patent standards: the developing countries seek to use
the technology transfer provisions in TRIPS to support their own local
industries, while the developed countries focus upon IP rights protection to
protect their industries. Viewed within this context, developing countries
will not necessarily seek to violate TRIPS, but have little incentive to
increase patent protection beyond TRIPS either.97 There are several reasons
why developing countries will not increase existing TRIPS patent
protections. These include "economic start-up costs, the reluctance to grant
monopoly rights to foreign companies instead of local industries and
increases in consumer prices. 98
Certainly there are many other reasons why developing countries
may not have incentives to go beyond the TRIPS provisions, but the chief
opposition to increasing TRIPS protection in Argentina has been the local
pharmaceutical industry. 99 Countries with strong domestic pharmaceutical
industries perceive an unbalanced economic playing field between
themselves and the United States and have enacted or proposed legislation
within the parameters of the TRIPS Agreement to counter such an

94 CORREA, supra note 2, at 102.

95 See id.
96 See Correa, supra note 86, at 122-23 ("[I]nfluenced by the underlying [procompetitive] philosophy of TRIPS, many countries have followed this path in their recent
reforms.").
97 See J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation
With the Developing Countries?,32 CASE W. REs. J.INT'L L. 441, 450-51 (2000).
98 See Correa, supra note 86, at 119.

99 See id.
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imbalance.) ° It is not clear if several provisions of the Argentine patent
legislation are legal under TRIPS since parts of the legislation are currently
being challenged in the WTO dispute process. 0 ' However, even if the
WTO does not find any of the recently enacted legislation actionable, there
is still an underlying tension between what TRIPS requires and what the
United States wants.1° 2
The next few sections will compare and contrast the several key
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the implementing Argentine
legislation. Except for the provisions of the legislation currently subject to
WTO consultations, the legislation largely mirrors the requirements of
TRIPS and is subject to the same ambiguities and interpretation problems.
Although the USTR frequently cites Argentina as a violator of the TRIPS
Agreement, the real issue with Argentina's patent legislation is not its
compliance with TRIPS but its reluctance to legislate beyond the TRIPS

treaty.
1. TRIPS Article 65: Transnational Arrangements for
Developing Countries
A concession to developing countries without prior pharmaceutical
patent protection came in the form of a ten-year delay in the
10 3
implementation of patents for pharmaceuticals and chemical products.
Since Argentina did not allow pharmaceutical products to be patented
before the TRIPS Agreement, it could elect to use the ten-year transition
period to enact and enforce the legislation complying with TRIPS.1°4
Argentina elected to reduce the transition period for pharmaceutical patents
05
to five years in Article 100 of Law 24,481 on Patents and Utility Models.
The transition period is subject to two requirements: (1) developing
countries must provide exclusive marketing rights to the holder of patents
10o Id.
'0' See U.S. 1999 Consultations, supra note 50; see also U.S. 2000 Consultations, supra
note 57.
102See generally CORREA, supra note 2, at 49-98 (noting gaps that encourage nations to
formulate their own local policies).
103See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 65. The General Provisions and Basic
Principles of the TRIPS Agreement note that the socialized need of developing countries
need to be recognized in the creation of maximum flexibility in domestic implementation of
laws and regulations.
104 See id. at art. 38 (excluding pharmaceutical products from patent protection for 10
years).
105See Law No. 24,481, on Patents and Utility Models, tit. VIII, art. 100 (1995) (Arg.)
("Inventions relating to pharmaceutical products shall not be patentable until five years have
elapsed following the publication of this Law in the Official Gazette.") [hereinafter
Argentine Patent Law].
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filed in other countries; and (2) developing countries may not adopt IP laws
lower than the TRIPS standards during the transition period.1°6 The
transition period provided by TRIPS and followed by Argentina both
contain provisions requiring that patents filed during the transitional period
must receive protection in the form of exclusive marketing rights.1' 7
The question still remains whether Argentina can extend its
transition period beyond the five-year period it has publicly committed to.
As explained earlier, the Argentine Congress has several pieces of
legislation pending since the U.S. request for consultations that would
amend the patent law to include a longer transition period. 08 Such a delay
may be legal under TRIPS, but it is in direct conflict with U.S. efforts to
strengthen IP protection in the Americas by 2005. Furthermore, there are
also questions as to what aspects of the transition period apply to disputes
between patent holders and third parties. Since many developing countries
did not enact domestic legislation concurrent with ratification of the TRIPS
Agreement, the question remains as to how and when these provisions will
be enforced. Argentina has encountered many interpretation issues and
these problems are addressed in a later section. Such problems should be a
signal to countries that TRIPS is not the ending point to patent protection it is only the beginning.
2. TRIPS Article 31: Compulsory Licensing/Home Production
Requirements
a. Compulsory Licensing
Like the transition period, compulsory licensing was another
concession to developing countries' °9 and the TRIPS Agreement does not
explicitly prohibit legislation that grants compulsory licenses or that allows
As stated earlier, the compulsory
for government use of patents.1n
licensing provisions of the TRIPS Agreement were opposed by the United
States and have been a frequent point of contention between the US and
Argentina. However, with the exception of several provisions in the
Argentine patent legislation, the requirements of TRIPS and the patent
legislation are the same. Hence, whether the grant of compulsory licenses
will result in a lower standard of TRIPS protection will be a matter for local
courts and the WTO dispute panel to decide.
106

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 65.

107

Id. at art. 70.9; Argentine Patent Law, supra note 104, at art. 8.

108

See Argentine Congress Holds Back, supra note 59, at 3.

109 See Correa, supra note 86, at 120-21.
110 The language in Article 31 states that "where a law of a member allows for other use"

implying the ability of countries to legislate compulsory licensing provisions. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 31.
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Despite the grant of power to use compulsory licenses, the device is
still subject to restrictions that must not undermine the rights of the patent
holder. 1' Unfortunately, TRIPS does not give explicit standards or
examples of what may undermine the patent holder's rights and countries
are free to legislate as long as the level of protection granted does not fall
below the minimum standards of TRIPS." 2 As stated above, the Argentine
law included a provision that authorizes compulsory licensing within 150
days if reasonable terms and conditions have been offered to an inventor for
exploitation and the offers have been rejected and the inventor has not
exploited his invention. 113 Exceptions to this rule include force majeure
and patent registration delays beyond the control of the inventor. 14 Even
though the TRIPS Agreement does not prohibit these licensing
requirements, the United States opposes this provision on several grounds.
First, the provision unduly restricts the patent holders' property right. 15
Second, and more importantly, at the time of the legislation, Argentina was
the only country to have enacted such a provision and the United States is
worried other developing countries will follow suit. 116
Even if the patent holder becomes subject to a compulsory license,
he is still eligible to receive royalties for his invention under Article 43.117
The royalty amount will be determined by the circumstances of each case,
the economic value of the authorization, and the average rate of royalties
payable in the sector concerned under contractual licenses between
independent parties. 118 Compulsory licensing can also occur when the
holder of the patent engages in anti-competitive practices." 9 Anticompetitive practices include excessive pricing, refusal to supply the
market on reasonable terms, and restricting production.12
A third
restriction on the rights of patent holders is federal
action
to
exploit
the
patent in cases of national emergency or security.121 Again, the TRIPS

1 Argentine Patent Law, supra note 104, at art. 47.
112

See CORREA, supra note 2, at 89-94.

113

Argentine Patent Law, supra note 104, at art. 43.

114

id.

1'

See 1999 U.S. Consultations, supra note 50. See also 2000 U.S. Consultations, supra

note 57.
116 See WTO Patent Compliance, supra note 61, at 3-5.
117

Argentine Patent Law, supra note 104, at art. 43.

11 Id.
"9 Id. at art. 44.
120 id.
121

Id. at art. 45.
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Agreement does not prohibit any of these actions but
the United States
122
views these provisions as weakening TRIPS standards.
It is debatable whether these provisions regarding the 150 day limit
violate TRIPS, but it is important to note that the patent holder is not left
without recourse if any of the above occur; compulsory licensing is subject
to judicial review in civil and federal courts. 123 Argentine courts have not
interpreted these provisions yet, but other countries such as Thailand have
had to wrestle with the parameters of compulsory licensing in the TRIPS
Agreement for health reasons. 2 4 The USTR response was to impose heavy
diplomatic pressure against such use of the patent despite the fact it was
legal under TRIPS.'15
b. Home Production/Quotas
The United States is opposed to any legislative proposals that
126
require foreign drug manufacturers to produce their products locally.
However, other Latin American countries have adopted this position and it
is arguable whether such a requirement will be legal under the TRIPS
Agreement. Developing countries view home production as a way to
counter the negative welfare effects of the initial implementation of strong
IP laws. Argentine officials point out that after Chile adopted IP laws
favored by the United States, the local pharmaceutical industry disappeared
and hope to avoid the same result.
c. Article 39: Undisclosed Information/Test Data
As stated in Section I, the United States initiated consultations in
the WTO in May of 1999 regarding a 1996 amendment to Argentina's
patent legislation. 2 7 TRIPS Article 39 unequivocally provides that "test
122 id.
123

Id. at art. 48.

124

The Ministry of Public Health in Thailand recently decided it will not allow for the

compulsory licensing of the AIDS drug didanosine due to fear that the United States would
retaliate with trade sanctions. Although the USTR indicated that it would not impose trade
sanctions if the licensing complies with TRIPS. Internal officials still worried about the
repercussions of compulsory licensing because of a perception that the United States does
not want the ddl case in Thailand to set a precedent for other countries. See Aphaluck
Bhatiasevi & Woranuj Maneerungsee, Compulsory ddl Licensing Seen Unlikely, BANGKOK
PosT, Feb. 2, 2000, at 4.
125 See Section I of this Note, supra.
126 See Argentina Reviews IP Rights Laws; US Commerce Secretary Warns Over Local
Production Plans,MARKETLErrER, Feb. 28, 2000, availablein 2000 WL 7540747. See also
US Threatens Trade Sanctions ifArgentina Extends Patent Law, AFX NEWS, Feb. 17,
2000, availablein LEXIS, News File, AFX News.
127 See Section II of this Note, supra.
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data provided by a company in order to obtain marketing approval for
agricultural and chemical products must be protected against unfair
commercial use...[and] disclosure."'2 The only exception to this
requirement is the "necessary protection of the public. 129 Argentina did
not explicitly cite public health concerns as the reason for the amended
legislation. Despite the legislation, Article 25 of Patent Law 24,481 still
applies and states, "pending patent applications and annexes shall remain
confidential until the time of their publication." 130 The problem is that
Argentina's law allows publication six months after the time of filing. Since
TRIPS did not proscribe specific publication limits, Argentina has specified
a time limit in its legislation.
d. Articles 70.8 and 70.9: Exclusive Marketing Rights
for Pharmaceutical Products
Argentina's provisions for exclusive marketing rights are the
second part of U.S. requests for consultations in the WTO.1 31 TRIPS
Articles 70.9 and 70.8 state that transitional period countries must grant
EMRs to patent holders from other countries who wish to market the
product in their country and have not obtained a patent.13 2 Argentina grants
exclusive marketing rights in Article 101 of Patent Law 24,481.33 EMRs
are valid until the TRIPS transitional period ends (November, 2000 for
1 34
Argentina) and are subject to an important and controversial exception.
Argentina will not enforce EMRs when a "third party or parties making use
of the [inventor's] invention without his authorization guarantee that the
domestic market will be fully supplied at the same actual prices. 135 If the
inventor's product is copied because another person is willing to sell at a
lower price, the inventor can collect fair and reasonable remuneration from
the third parties and the remuneration is set by the INPI. 136 The legislation
specifically stated that such provisions would appl X unless the WTO
adopted a contrary position into the TRIPS Agreement.

128 TRIPS

Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 39.

129

id.

130

Argentine Patent Law, supra note 104, at art. 25.

131 See

U.S. 1999 Consultations, supra note 50. See also U.S. 2000 Consultations, supra

note 57.
132 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 70.8, 70.9.
133 Argentine
134

id.

135

Id.

136Id.
137

id.

Patent Law, supra note 104, at art. 101.
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Argentina further explained the EMR provisions to the Council for
138
TRIPS on February 17, 1999 when questioned by the United States.
Argentina specified that any EMR decisions may be appealed by the patent
holder in Argentine national courts 13 9 and explained that the grant of an
EMR is contingent upon the approval of both the INPI and the National
Food, Drug and Medical Technology Administration (ANMAT) (under
authority of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Action). 4°
B. Internal Impediments to Legislating the TRIPS Treaty
1. The Argentine Pharmaceutical Industry
While TRIPS imposes minimum standards for IP compliance, these
standards are not rigid. Article 1(1) of the TRIPS Agreement states,
"Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this agreement within their own legal
system and practice." 141 Although developing countries pay lip service to
strengthening IP rights, J.R. Reichman notes that "the TRIPS Agreement
leaves developing countries ample wiggle room in which to implement
national policies favoring the public interest in free competition."' 42
Countries may adopt differing interpretations of TRIPS provisions or
circumvent provisions entirely by enacting domestic legislation that favors
local industry. 143 However, TRIPS states that laws cannot be enacted
during the transition period that lower the standards of the TRIPS
Agreement.144 Such is the debate regarding Argentina's TRIPS
obligations. 45
Legislative infighting has led to some confusion about the actual
terms of Argentina's patent laws. 146 Unfortunately, due to the U.S. trade
sanctions imposed in 1997 and the pending WTO consultations,

138

See Argentine Response, supra note 47.

139See

id.

140 See id.

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 1.
142See Reichman, supra note 90, at 28.

141

See id. at 25-6.
'4 See id. at 26.
143

145 The U.S. Patent Office argued that no other country imposed such a requirement. See

Argentine Labs Would Urge WTO Case vs. Sanctions, Challu Says, INSIDE NAFTA, Mar. 6,
1996, at 11 [hereinafter Argentine Labs].
[46 See Correa, supra note 86, at 118 ("Argentina's patent system is not completely clear
due to legislative turbulence.").
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pharmaceutical IP rights are a highly contentious issue in Argentina. 47
Despite the political support and pledges of President Menem, there is
strong organized opposition to the U.S. efforts to strengthen patent
protection in Argentina. 149 The support is mostly due to the size of the
pharmaceutical industry in Argentina.
Supplemental to the problem of political opposition over IP rights
is corruption in Argentine politics. The United States asserts that the
political will of the legislators has been bought by the Argentine
pharmaceutical industry. There is significant evidence that both the Menem
administration and its opposition parties are corrupt.150 For example,
Claudio Sebastiani, an Argentine legislator, admitted to receiving large
sums of money from Argentine pharmaceutical companies.15 1 Again, the
United States is hardly blameless either - former Vice President Gore is
also noted to have received large contributions from U.S. pharmaceutical
interests.152
It does not appear that a compromise between the
pharmaceutical industries of either Argentina or the United States will
occur in the near to mid-future. Certainly a supportive legislature is
conducive to TRIPS enforcement. While Brazil faced the same interest
group opposition before and after the implementation of its patent act, the
pharmaceutical industry in Argentina has more to lose. Any change to the

status quo will ultimately result from economics rather than politics.

147 The U.S. attempt to change Argentina's domestic patent laws has been viewed as

economic imperialism. See MultinationalDrug Companies Dictate U.S. Trade Policy, PR
Newswire, Jan. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, General News & Information, PR Newswire
(noting that U.S. efforts to change Argentina's patent laws ignores the 'will of the people'.).
148Menem has made repeated promises that Argentina will strengthen its patent laws and
ensure that the laws are not weakened. See Menem objetaracambios en la ley de patentas
que afecten las inversion [Menem will object to changes in Patent Law], BUENOS AIRES
ECONOMICO, June 17, 1999, translated in WORLD REPORTER.
149It has been stated that the pharmaceutical lobby in Argentina is responsible for the
current state of affairs. $25 million was allegedly spent by Argentina's pharmaceutical
companies as bribes to legislators to hinder stronger IP laws. See Martin Edwin Andersen,
Argentina's Corruption Crooks Get Bragging Rights Under Federal Cover, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1999, at A23. However, the USTR is equally under the influence of the American
drug lobby. See Blood and Gore: Office of the US Trade Representative Goes Too FarIn
Promoting Interests of US Drug Companies Abroad, THE NATION, July, 19 1999, at 16.
("The USTR... has become a virtual appendage of the [U.S.] drug industry."). It has also
been acknowledged by the ITC that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry will benefit more than
any other sector of the U.S. economy from the TRIPS Agreement. See USTR Bows to
Pressureby MultinationalPharmaceuticalCompanies, PR NEwSwiRE, Apr. 22, 1997.
50
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The Pathto PatentLaw, supra note 15.
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2. Argentinean Economic Structure
While IP protection has been linked to economic development, it is
also well documented that the adoption of a strong IP regime can produce
short-term economic consequences.1 53 The problem with the TRIPS
approach to dispute resolution is that it focuses on results or sanctions
rather than the underlying problem of development thereby aggravating the
short-term economic consequences experienced by developing countries
adopting stricter IP standards.
The current patent regime has produced economic benefits to
Argentina and it has been recognized that lax protection offers economic
benefits to other developing nations as well.1 54 Currently, Argentina is
immersed in a recession that has impeded attempts to legislate IP
protection.1 55 Since 54% of the industry is domestically owned, the initial
impact of strong IP laws can further damage the economy.1 56 The pirate
pharmaceutical industry is worth $6 billion and supplies the rest of Latin
America with pharmaceuticals. 157 Although Brazil has recently enacted
strong IP rights protection, the rest of the Mercosur trading 151
bloc has not, so
there is less incentive and pressure to strengthen protection.
Incentives to
increase protection are also linked to future economic returns, but there is
mixed evidence regarding the ability of IP rights to increase development in
Latin America.1 59 Even if IP rights could result in immediate gains for
Argentina, several studies have noted that 6adequate
enforcement of
°
pharmaceutical patent laws is many years away.
Latin American countries have traditionally been forced to import
information-sensitive goods and services mainly because these countries do
153 See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32

W. RES. J. INT'L L. 471, 489-94 (2000) (noting how the short-term costs of IP rights
makes reform difficult).
154 See Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global
CASE

Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 331 (1993) ("Because pirates of
intellectual property incur minimal production costs and no royalty payments, they are in a
better position than legitimate producers to satisfy demands in developing countries.").
155 In 1995, after the first IP laws were introduced, Argentina GDP decreased by 2.5%
and the country suffered from record unemployment. A number of consumers also did not
have health insurance making people very conscious about drug prices. The pharmaceutical
market also fell by 2%. See Brazil Is Booming, supra note 76, at 5.
156 See Lynn Woods, Free Trade Fears:Intellectual PropertyDisputes Slow New Pactfor

the Americas, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 1999, at BWB 12.
117

See id.

158

See Correa, supra note 86, at 119.

159 See CORREA, supra note 2, at 23-30.
160 See Argentine Labs, supra note 144, at 11 (Challu notes that most of the innovation

occurs in five developed countries).
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not have the infrastructure that supports innovation.161 Given the lack of
infrastructure in Argentina and other Latin American countries, it is not
surprising that Latin American nationals generate less than one percent of
royalties from IP licenses. 162 Hence, the policies that affect many U.S.
pharmaceutical companies have a limited effect on the local IP rights
holders. More importantly, there has been research that suggests even with
strong patent protection the amount of research and development expended
will not significantly increase. 63 Most companies do not have the
technology to produce original pharmaceuticals.
In Latin America, technological innovation is focused on the
productive capacity of physical capital. 65 Public policy does not support
funding for the generation and absorption of applied knowledge. 66 For
example, there is a working requirement test for patent protection. If the
inventor ceased to use the patented technology for a short period of time or
used the technology in a way counter to the wishes of the political system,
167
the patent was revoked and the invention was declared public property.
If this is true for most of Latin America, then why have countries like
Brazil strengthened their IP rights while countries like Argentina resist?
One author points to the failure of import substitution in Brazil. From the
1930s to the 1980s many countries in Latin America believed that amassing
physical capital was the key to economic development. Brazil practiced an
extreme version of this idea and encouraged investment for domestic
manufacturing, suppressed agricultural prices, expanded public sector
enterprises and tried to stimulate domestic investment through tax
credits. 68
Unfortunately, other equally important factors of growth, such as
human capital and other microeconomic levers, were ignored by
policymakers. These import substitutes were still dependent on raw
materials and technology, but these materials were hard to acquire because
of the protected trade policies that existed. The pharmaceutical industry in
Brazil was one of many industries affected by this economic policy. 169 The
policy fell out of favor during the international debt crisis in the 1980s and
161

See EDUARDO

BUSCAGLIA & CLARISA LONG,

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA
162 id,
163

U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL

6 (1997).

United Nations Conference on Trade & Development: The TRIPS Agreement and

Developing Countries,supra note 68.
164 See id.
165

See BUSCAGLIA & LONG, supra note 161, at 19.

6

id.

167 See id.
168 See id.
169 See id.
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import competition was increased. 170 Concurrently, there was also a
demand for high technology imports that spurred the United States to
become more vigilant about IP protection. Because of the effects of the
failure of the import substitution program in Brazil, policymakers were
more sensitive to other forms of economic growth such as IP rights.,' As
stated earlier, Brazil also has less to lose in the pharmaceutical sector since
only 15% of the industry is domestically owned. 72 Argentina never carried
out a plan of import substitution to the level of its neighbor Brazil where
growth has been focused in other areas such as agricultural and textile
exports.
Although many Argentines feel that IP development will lead to
growth, it is only one piece of the puzzle; other structures such as funding
for human capital must be in place for such a plan to be successful.
However, just because Argentina's pharmaceutical industry is focused on
copying rather than research and development, there still may be some
immediate gains made. Several drug companies in India-another country
with a strong domestic industry-have made innovations from existing
patents that have profited the inventors. While this technique can help allay
some of the short-term economic disincentives for copiers, Argentina will
still have to voluntarily decide to increase its IP protection for successful
results.
3. Application of TRIPS Provisions by Administrative
Agencies And the Judiciary
The U.S. belief that Argentine courts do not enforce Article 70.9 of
the TRIPS Agreement illustrates the problem of enforcement in developing
countries. Strong laws are meaningless without the structure to enforce
them. 173 Structure is not limited to the judiciary-other areas of the
government need to coordinate their efforts also. Since the first place a
patent applicant will go is the patent office rather than the courts, the
existing administrative structure is an indicator of whether IP rights will be
170See

id. at 17.

171See id.
172 See id.
173 Proponents of strong IP rights often neglect this variable in the equation.

Many
countries that have increased IP rights protection at the urging of the United States have
strengthened their laws while neglecting to enforce them. For example, Mexico has a strong
record of apprehending pirated products and recently enacted stiffer penalties for copyright
violations. However, copyright enforcement is still problematic because "[w]hile Mexico
probably seizes more [pirated] product, they never convict anyone." Mexico Enacts Stricter
IP Rights Law, But U.S. Industry Fears Scant Compliance, AM. TRADE, June 3, 1999, at 1.
Furthermore, despite the fact that Brazil has the highest standard of IP protection in Latin
America, piracy is still a problem; Brazil is estimated to have one-third of the market for
pirated cassette tapes in Latin America. See BUSCAGLIA & LONG, supra note 161, at 16.
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enforced. For example, the enforcement of exclusive marketing rights for
pharmaceuticals is in the hands of two different Argentine agencies, the
Economic Ministry and the Ministry of Public Health.1 74 An exclusive
marketing right provides protections similar to a patent and is a way for
companies to protect their pharmaceutical products until patent protection
for pharmaceuticals is granted. 175 Unfortunately, the two agencies have
ineffectively coordinated their jurisdiction, and it has thus been difficult to
adhere to Article 70.9. While the Ministry of Public Health approves all
drugs sold in Argentina, the Economic Ministry is charged with protecting
exclusive marketing rights.17 6 As a result, companies with pirated
pharmaceuticals approach the Ministry of Public Health to sell the drugs
without consulting the Economic Ministry. 177
Irregularities have also been reported regarding the EMR
application process. In September of 1998, the U.S. drug manufacturer Eli
Lilly was granted an EMR for its drug Zyprexa by Norma Felix who was
After Ms. Felix signed the
head of the Intellectual Property Institute.
document, it disappeared from her office but reappeared later with
1 79
information missing and a recommendation that the EMR be denied.
After the incident, Ms. Felix lost her position and was replaced by an
advisor to Humberto Ruggerio, a noted supporter of the Argentine
pharmaceutical industry.180 Currently, Eli Lilly cannot enforce its EMR
and is involved in litigation with an Argentina lab that markets its drug as
"FDA approved. 18' The former advisor to Ruggerio, Horacio Hackenov,
had his term extended another four months in June 2000 despite protests
from the United States.18 2 Other incidents include a fire at the Argentine
Patent Office that destroyed many patent applications. 8 3 This lack of
Indeed, since these drug
transparency should not be unexpected.
manufacturers have brought money into the Argentine economy, 1 4 it is

174

See Torres, supra note 6.

's

See id.

176

See id.

'77 See id.
178

See id.

179See id.

180 See id.
181 id.
182

See Argentine PatentRegime, supra note 34.

183Id.

184See Helene Cooper, Argentina Faces Sanctionsby US over Drug Patents,WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 16, 1997, at All (noting that Argentine drug makers also export their products
throughout South America).
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difficult to see why Argentina would want to enforce laws not favorable to

its domestic industry."s5

The TRIPS Agreement lets countries establish their own structure
for administrating and enforcing IP rights; however, it is unrealistic to think
that countries without existing or effective IP laws will fulfill their TRIPS
obligations immediately. This does not mean that industrialized countries
cannot take an active role in assisting developing countries or develop
initiatives for compliance. Since trade sanctions, negotiations, and WTO
consultations have produced limited results, it may be time for the United
States and other countries to change their tactics. 18V As Bruce Lehman said,
"there is more to intellectual property recognition than getting other
countries to sign the agreement and enact laws... [p]art of the needed
follow-up is to...improve judicial systems for the enforcement of new
standards.' ' 7 For example, in 1991 Mexico enacted IP legislation that
included patent protection for pharmaceutical products. 88 In the first few
years of operation the patent office had huge delays, prompting the United
States to pledge $250,000 to train patent officers in patent examination and
set up an effective administrative system. 8 9 The program was a success
and the backlog was eliminated; supporters of the program cited that small

185 See

Frederick M. Abbott, The New Global Technology Regime: The WTO TRIPS
Agreement and Global Economic Development, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 385, 399 (1996)
(finding that developing countries will "continue to resist changes to their [intellectual
property rights] laws, and when they do make changes, they will be slow to enforce them in
favor of foreign enterprises.").
186 Although it is easy to pin the current IP problems in Argentina on a greedy
pharmaceutical industry, Raul Zavalla Carbo, the director of CIFLA, stated that "Acquiring
patents and paying royalties is no problem for us.. .what we want is the right to compete."
See PharmaceuticalPatentsAccepted ifLinked to Compulsory Licensing, PAT. TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Nov. 14, 1989), available in LEXIS, News Library, BNA
file. During the late 1980s, 54 of 88 laboratories were Argentine, 57% of the sales went into
the Argentine economy, and 6 of 10 Argentine labs had the highest sales volume in the
country in the pharmaceutical industry. There have been some concerns about the increased
presence of U.S. firms once Argentina began to reform its patent laws. However, while
Argentina's pharmaceutical laws are not up to U.S. standards, the country is gearing up for
the 2000 deadline. Two of the largest Argentine pharmaceutical companies are reported not
to produce copies anymore and large amounts of money has been devoted to modernizing
current plants. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,supra note 63, at 18.
187 See Witnesses Urge Use of Foreign Aid to Improve Foreign IP Protection, PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (May 5, 1994), available in LEXIS, News

Library, BNA file.
188 See id.
189 See id.
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amounts of money spent had paid large dividends for the people who were
able to register their patents.19
4. Judicial Enforcement
The foundation of TRIPS enforcement rests with the judiciary;
many of the disputes regarding the TRIPS Agreement will center on how
the agreement is enforced domestically.'t9 However, the existence of IP
laws and a body to enforce the laws are only two pieces of the foundation
for a strong IP system. As explained in the following section, the judiciary
must have familiarity, technical knowledge, and a historical preference for
strong IP rights to truly be successful. Furthermore, judicial enforcement
will also be affected by domestic legislation enacted to implement TRIPS
obligations. Many authors and officials have noted that the TRIPS
enforcement
enforcement
92 criteria are ambiguous and have predicted
problems1
This section will explain how the above factors have worked
together to reduce the effectiveness of the TRIPS Agreement and examine
existing Argentine cases interpreting the newly enacted patent legislation.
While domestic enforcement is an important part of the TRIPS Agreement,
the WTO provides the means for international enforcement as well. Due to
the recent interpretation of exclusive marketing rights by the Argentine
courts, the United States and Switzerland filed requests for WTO
consultations in 1999 and the United States has threatened a WTO suit in
2000. International enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement is limited to the
United States v. India,t93 which involved different complaints regarding
EMRs. Unlike India, Argentina already has functioning EMR laws and an
office for administrating the EMRs. Although the decision provided
important guidelines for international and domestic enactment of EMRs, the
decision did not articulate guidelines for judicial enforcement of the EMR
during the transitional period.

190 See id. The USTR voiced lukewarm support for the bill citing administrative
difficulties and the bill, therefore, never became law. See Administration Offers Cool
Response to Intellectual Property Protection Bills, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
DAILY (BNA), (May 5, 1994), availablein LEXIS, News Library, BNA file.
191 Disputes are most likely to arise over enforcement issues. See USTR Official Predicts
Difficulty in Forcing Compliance With TRIPS, AM. TRADE, July 15, 1999, at 1, 11-12.
[hereinafter TRIPS Compliance].
'92

See id.

193 GATT Dispute Panel Report on EC Complaint Concerning India's Patent Protection
for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Report of the Panel #98-3091,
WT/DS79/R, August 24, 1998, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop--eI
dispu.e/dispu.status__e.htm#1997.
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5. Judicial Enforcement of Patent Rights Before TRIPS
A trait shared by many developing countries is a limited or nonexistent regard for IP rights. Latin America is no exception to this. 94 IP in
Latin America before the TRIPS Agreement was seen as information with
commercial value'95 or the heritage of humanity rather than an individual
asset. 19 6 Most of Latin American IP jurisprudence is based on territory and
independence that are incompatible with international enforcement required
by the TRIPS Agreement. 97 These doctrines had their foundations in the
Paris and Berne agreements. The Calvo Doctrine was named for Argentine
jurist Carlos Calvo and states that aliens are only entitled to those legal
rights and privileges enjoyed by nationals and hence may seek redress for
grievances only before local authorities and to the extent permitted by local
law. 198 This doctrine, combined with a history of regarding inventions as
belonging in the public domain, helps explain much of the resistance to the
industrialized nations' pressure to change existing laws. Of course,
Argentina's signature on the TRIPS Agreement nullifies this doctrine, but
Argentina is still in the developing country transition period with respect to
pharmaceuticals and has not enacted laws that correspond with the U.S.
interpretation of TRIPS. 199 Hence, it is not surprising that the judiciary still
follows the principles of territory and places greater emphasis on national
interests rather than U.S. or industrialized nation interests.
Since Argentina does not have a tradition of strong IP protection, it
is not surprising that many judges do not have significant amounts of
experience deciding IP cases. Robert Sherwood notes that "trademark
cases are processed routinely...but patent litigation is almost unknown so
judges are unfamiliar with this area of intellectual property law." 200 The
problem may start even before the judge sits on the bench; a study on the
judiciary found that most Latin American law schools do not offer specialty
courses in IP. Furthermore, the tradition of limited IP protection was
further shaped by the penalties given to infractions. Infringements were not
taken seriously because penalties for patent infringement were nominal or
non-existent. 20
194See BUSCAGLIA & LONG,

supra note 160, at 4, 12.

195Id.
196 Id.
197 See

id. at 12.

198 See id.
199 Id.
200 See

Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Propertyfor Latin America: How Soon Will it

Work?, NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM., Spring 1998, at 77-78.
201 See id at 77. The enforcement provisions of TRIPS may lack bite as well. One USTR
official stated, "[t]he enforcement provisions say that countries agree to put into their law
provisions for criminal and civil remedies, but then it's up to a judge to implement that on a
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When patent cases were decided, they favored copiers of
technology. Under the old patent law, the process rather than the final
product was the only part of a discovery that could be patented. 2 2 The law
was broadened when the Supreme Court of Argentina found that product
patents can only be enforced for those products with different types of
chemical production processes. 2 3 While both the process and final product
are now patentable under the Argentine patent law, pre-TRIPS rulings may
still have repercussions for pharmaceutical manufacturers. For example, it
is unclear whether patents will be refused for processes that cannot be
duplicated. The TRIPS Agreement does not provide any explicit guidance
on this problem, but several TRIPS sections contain a limited set of criteria
by which patent applications could be refused and countries like Argentina
may invoke these provisions in future cases based on past principles like the
holding in the Supreme Court case mentioned above.
6. Weaknesses in TRIPS Enforcement Procedures
The largest problem with TRIPS enforcement criteria is
ambiguity. 20 4 This ambiguity, coupled with the lack of obligation to devote
extra resources to the enforcement of IP rights, 20 5 will cause many problems
for the domestic enforcement of the TRIPS provisions. According to
Joseph Papovich, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Services,
Investment and Intellectual Property, "[T]he enforcement provisions [must
have] criminal and civil remedies... [but] it's up to the judge to implement
that.. .and there is concern.. .that judges might not take seriously these
provisions. 20 6 The TRIPS enforcement procedures are comprised of
Articles 42-45 and list different types of damages available to parties and
authority for enforcement. Each article states that countries "shall have the
authority" to use the procedures in those sections but the article does not
state that the procedures "must be followed."'20 7
Aside from how to enforce the patent legislation, significant
confusion also exists as to when TRIPS or the Argentine patent legislation
should be enforced. Argentina's status as a developing country allows it to
case-by-case basis.. .there is concern... that judges may not take seriously these provisions,
that they might just slap peoples' wrists." TRIPS Compliance,supra note 191, at 11.
202 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research Based PharmaceuticalCompanies: The Needfor
Improved PatentProtection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TEcH. 307, 312-13 (1987).
20' See id. at 312.
204 See TRIPS Compliance, supra note 191. An official at the USTR has acknowledged
problems with TRIPS enforcement procedures and noted that enforcement is often
discretionary under Articles 42-45. See id. at 11.
205 See id.
206 Id.
207 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at arts. 42-45.
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use the transition provisions of Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement; the
provisions state that legislation does not have to be implemented
immediately with regard to pharmaceutical patents. Because the enactment
of the Argentine patent law was piecemeal, significant confusion exists as
to when various provisions had taken effect. There are also problems of
consistency in the legislation itself. Robert Sherwood noted that while a
new patent law and presidential decree was in place during 1996,
subsequent legislation enacted in December of 1996 clashes not only with
the prior legislation but with the TRIPS Agreement as well (the 1994
constitution makes international treaties superior to national law). 08 Much
of the legislation was also accompanied by executive decrees of President
Menem that were used to bypass the opposition of the Argentine Congress.
These decrees are often not subject to judicial review but it has been stated
that presidential decrees regarding patent laws will not carry the same
weight as a measure passed by both houses of the Argentine Congress. 2°9
Given the above problems and prior history of IP jurisprudence in
Argentina, it is no surprise that patent protection has still not progressed in
Argentine courts.
7. Litigation After the Adoption of TRIPS and the New Patent
Law
The results of the first series of cases interpreting the new patent
law have been mostly negative. The newly enacted patent legislation does
not allow the holder of an exclusive marketing right to bring a suit against a
third party until the TRIPS transition period is over. The only litigated case
regarding exclusive marketing rights was decided recently and involved Eli
210 Eli
Lilly and a local pharmaceutical company, Laboratorios Gandor SA.
Lilly was granted an EMR by the patent office for a pharmaceutical
composition. 211 Laboratorios Gador filed a suit against the patent office to
have the EMR revoked because they manufactured and marketed the
product protected under Eli Lilly's EMR before Eli Lilly's product reached
the Argentine market.21 2 While the lower court upheld the EMR, it also
restricted the enforceability of the EMR when another party was already
working the invention. This is a large setback because many products are
marketed and used in Argentina before the foreign patent holders can
208

See Sherwood, supra note 198, at 88.

209

See Maria Dakolias, A Strategyfor JudicialReform: The Experience in Latin America,

36 VA. J. INT'LL. 167, 175-76 (1995).
210 See Baker & McKenzie, Patents: Case Law Arisen From the Introduction of the New
Patent Law, 2 LATIN AM. INTELL. PROP. NEWSLMER 1, 4 (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter Baker &
McKenzie].
211 See id.
212

See id.
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market their products in Argentina. 21 3 The case went to the court of appeals
and the court partially upheld the primary ruling by restricting Gador's
manufacture of the product after 2000.214 Also as a result of this ruling, the
Patent Office has now started to publish EMRs for opposition claim
purposes
even though this is not mentioned in TRIPS or the new patent
215
law.
8. Confusion Over Patent Term Limits
It is not surprising that some of the early judicial cases interpreting
domestic legislation have dealt with the legitimacy of existing and pending
patent applications. The United States actively campaigned for an approach
that would have retroactively granted patent rights to foreign patent holders
to the extent the product had not been introduced into the market ("pipeline
protection"). 2 16 Numerous South American countries and the final draft of
the TRIPS Agreement did not adopt this approach.2 1 7 Argentine and
Brazilian Courts have both wrestled with the effective enforcement dates of
patents during the TRIPS transition period. 218 The old Argentine law
granted patents for fifteen years from the date of the grant, while Articles
33 and 70 of the TRIPS Agreement set the term at twenty years. Given the
piecemeal enactment of the patent law, 1 9 there exists some confusion as to
when the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement became effective in law.
Several issues have been litigated and the results are mixed. Two primary
issues have surfaced in the existing litigation: (1) is Article 33 of the TRIPS
Agreement self-executing; and (2) does Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement
(allowing countries to delay the application for patents) affect the length of
patent terms for current applicants.

213

See id.

214 See id.
215 See id.

216 See Correa, supra note 86, at 118.
217

See id.

218

The Argentine judicial response is discussed later. Brazil's Appellate Courts dealt

with this issue in 1999. See Otto B. Licks, Court of Appeals finds TRIPS Self-Executing,
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Aug. 6, 1999), available in LEXIS,
News Library, BNA file. Surprisingly, Brazil recently lowered the level of IP protection
before its TRIPS deadline. Pipeline protection for pharmaceutical products has been
eliminated. See Otto B. Licks, Government Makes Sudden Changes to Newly Enacted
PatentLaw, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (Feb. 16, 2000), availablein
LEXIS, News Library, BNA file.
219 Id. See also Baker & McKenzie, supra note 210, at 2.
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9. Effective Date of the New Patent Law
As stated in Section II, the Argentine patent law evolved through
three different pieces of legislation with various provisions amended and
revoked during and after each of the three enactments. Hence, the effective
date of the new law was one of the primary issues in the early cases.
Several courts have established that September 29, 1995, the date Law
24,481 was enacted, is the effective date of the legislation. While these
decisions are currently under appeal in the Argentine Supreme Court, it is
expected the court will reaffirm the decision of the lower courts.220
10. Effective Date of the TRIPS 20-year Patent Term
On August 11, 1998, Chamber 3 of the Court of Appeals in
Industrie PirelliSpA v. INPI overturned a lower court ruling and found that
TRIPS Article 33 did not apply automatically even though the TRIPS
Agreement had been ratified.2 Hence, even though the TRIPS Agreement
had been ratified before the patent expired, Pirelli's patent still expired
before the new patent
act and the grant of the twenty-year patent term.
~222
Pirelli's patent information was considered to be public domain.
The
court also ruled that in view of the five-year transition period granted to
Argentina as a developing country, only patents in force by January 1, 2000
would be entitled to the twenty-year term under TRIPS. 2 The ruling has
even greater implications if the Argentine legislature decides to extend the
transition period in another five years for pharmaceutical patents, since
more patents will expire by that time.
11. Patent Applications Filed Under the Old Law but Granted
Under the New Law
Patents filed under the old patent act but granted after the new
patent act are treated differently than patents whose terms expired before
the enactment of the new patent act. The treatment has been analyzed as
more favorable to patent holders, but the case is inconsistent with the above
holding in Industrie Pirelli.The court found patents granted under the new
law are given twenty-year terms regardless of the TRIPS transitional
period. There is some inconsistency between the various interpretations of
the terms for completed and pending patents. The same court in Industrie
Pirelli stated in the same opinion that the twenty-year term is applicable for
patents pending during the enactment of the patent act effective September

220

See Baker & McKenzie, supra note 210, at 2.

2' See id. at 3.
222

See id.

223 See id.
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29, 1995. 224 The inconsistency has carried over into other Courts of
Appeal. Two months later, on October 8, 1998, Chamber 2 of the Court of
Appeals also found in BASF AG vs. INPI that patents filed under the old
law but granted under the new law would be granted the twenty year term
as provided in the new patent act and TRIPS. 225 The court ruled that
patents could be effective under the patent law or TRIPS despite Chamber
2's statement that the provisions of TRIPS regarding patent terms did not
apply until 2000.226
12. Injunctive Relief and the TRIPS Transition Period
TRIPS Article 44 states that countries have the authority to provide
but the transition period
injunctive relief in IP infringement cases
adopted by Argentina to implement this provision has caused some
confusion in the Argentine courts. On June 25, 1998, Chamber 2 of the
Federal Court of Appeals issued an order for injunctive relief in Johnson &
Son Inc. ciClorox Argentina S.A.s/medidades cautelares, stating that the
judiciary can issue injunctive relief in patent infringement cases on the
basis of Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement. 2 However, in Novartis AG v.
Ipsesa SA, decided February 16, 1999, another court of appeals found that
the new patent law effectively delayed the application of the TRIPS
provisions. Hence, in the instant patent infringement cases Article 50 could
not apply.229 Consequently, Ipsesa was allowed to continue with its
infringement actions.
As demonstrated by the above cases, there is significant confusion
and contradiction regarding the application of the TRIPS Agreement in
relation to the patent law. Further litigation and clarification is needed
before all of the issues regarding Argentina's domestic and international
obligations are answered. It is not likely that even with the advent of the
2000 deadline for developing countries that change will suddenly appear.
In the short run, patent holders will face significant uncertainty in the
Argentine courts.

224 See id.
225 See id. at 3-4.
226

id.

227 See id. at 4.
228

See id.

229 See id.
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C. External Impediments to Strong IP Rights in
Argentina
1. U.S. Trade Policy in Argentina
Although external initiatives to raise the standards of the TRIPS
treaty include cooperation, the United States prefers coercion. As Section II
explained, the patenting of pharmaceutical products has been a long tug-ofwar between the United States and Argentina. Ironically, the net effect of
U.S. pressure has been to decrease efforts to legislate additional IP
protections. 230 IP is seen as a bargaining chip in the hands of the Argentine
government - especially since over half of the country's exports are
subjected to U.S. tariffs. 231 The tariffs also include Argentine
pharmaceutical and chemical products because of their link to Argentina's
patent legislation, thereby making the sanctions even more inflammatory. 2
While the tariffs are in place largely due to Argentina's treatment
of pharmaceuticals, the subject of IP rights enforcement surfaces in other
trade disputes as well.23 By unilaterally imposing tariffs on Argentine
exports, many believed that the United States ignored TRIPS and acted
outside of international law. 4 There is little political will to enforce the
new patent laws because
the pressure to enact the legislation was external
rather than internal. 235 Part of the anger over the U.S. attempts to enforce
greater IP rights is the fact that Argentina became one of the first
developing countries to codify the TRIPS Agreement in its national

230 See Correa, supra note 86, at 119 (stating that "direct and open intervention of the US
government has served to delay, rather than accelerate changes").
231 When the Tariffs were announced the government threatened action against a bill
pending in Congress aimed at curbing US involvement in government procurement contracts
and the current push to extend the transition period may be a result of the tariffs. See US
Listing of Goods to Lose GSP Benefits Spurs Anger in Argentina, INSIDE NAFTA, Apr. 17,
1997, at 30. Similarly, after the United States brought Argentina to the WTO, several bills
were introduced in Argentina to extend the patent transition period. The Argentine
government said that these measures were not in response to the consultations but to unfair
agricultural subsidies. See WTO Patent Compliance,supra note 61, at 3-5.
232

id.

233 See id.
234 See id.
235 See Argentine Congress Holds Back, supra note 59.

See also BANKOLE SODIPO,
PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING, GATr, TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 269 (1997)

(noting that "where laws are passed by national governments solely due to foreign pressure,
without any significant advantages for local interests, there may be no political will on the
part of the government to enforce the laws...").
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legislation. 3 6 As J.H. Reichman argues, "if the developed countries push
too hard and too fast, the developing and least developed countries will also
find ways to push back. ' ,2 37 Legislation was enacted prior to the trade
sanctions that curtailed patent protection and several other measures were
attempted in response to the USTR's measures.238 The USTR recognized
that the sanctions would have little effect on the Argentine IP rights stance
but argued that the move was politically necessary. The Argentine
government vocalized its wish for the dispute to be brought before the
WTO,239 but the United States did not press the issue until May 2000,
preferring instead to use sanctions. 240 The United States believed the
dispute could not be taken to the WTO because Argentina is a developing
country under TRIPS and does not have to enforce certain parts of the
treaty until 2000, the deadline for developing countries. 241Arguably, a
favorable WTO decision will still not change matters due to enforcement
problems. 242
While the Argentine government favors the dispute mechanisms of
the WTO over trade sanctions, Argentine politicians feel they have been
pushed too far and are beginning to scale back all of the advances IP rights
have made since the TRIPS Agreement through several pieces of
legislation. 243 First, a bill was introduced to unilaterally extend patent
protection another five years. 244 A second proposal has also been made to
require local production as a condition for patent protection. The third
proposal would add requirements to the procedure of receiving exclusive
marketing rights. 245 As stated earlier, Argentine politicians agreed to
forestall any attempts to extend the TRIPS transition period. The issue of
Other politicians such as Menem and Peronist Presidential candidate Eduardo Duhalde
criticized legislation relaxing patent requirements as shortsighted and have refused to accept
contributions from the Argentine pharmaceutical industry. See Margalit Edelman, Treading
on Toes in US-Argentine Trade Tango, J.OFCOM., June 29, 1999, at 6.
237 Reichman, supra note 88, at 356.
236

238

See generally id. (describing Argentine patent law development).

239 See Argentine Labs, supra note 144, at 10.
240

See id.
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See Hess, supra note 78. The U.S. action begs the question: How can the United

States accuse Argentina of TRIPS violations if Argentina is not under WTO jurisdiction
until 2000?
242 The United States unilaterally believes that transitional periods should end for
countries it no longer considers undeveloped. See id.
243 One PhRMA official commented that, "Argentina's IP rights protections have been
'systematically watered down."' PhRMA Official Says Many Countries Still Not Complying
With TRIPS, AM. TRADE, Oct. 15, 1998, at 11.
244 The bill has strong support. See WTO Patent Compliance, supra note 61, at 3.
245

See id.
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local production still remains and Argentine manufacturers feel some
concessions need to be made to preserve the local pharmaceutical industry.
2. The WTO's Section 301 Ruling: Are U.S. Trade Sanctions a
Toothless Threat?
As stated in Section II, the USTR's favored method to secure
increased IP protection is to impose or threaten trade sanctions. Serious
debate has arisen among WTO members whether unilateral trade sanctions
to increase TRIPS standards are legal. The complainants were comprised
of both industrialized and developing countries indicating a widespread
dissatisfaction with the USTR's use of trade sanctions under Section 301.
The WTO issued its opinion at the end of last year and imposed several
restrictions on the use of unilateral trade sanctions. While the WTO upheld
the compatibility of Sections 301-310 of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act with
GATT, the ruling panel did specifically state that the statutory language of
Sections 301-310 was a violation of WTO rules. 246 Former President
Clinton subsequently issued a statement that the United States will avoid
unilaterally imposed Section 301 trade sanctions unless the WTO finds a
violation has occurred.2 47
The Panel Decision is important to Argentina and other developing
countries because the United States must resolve the IP dispute in the WTO
before unilaterally imposing sanctions. In a sense, the WTO has found the
past unilateral trade sanctions against Argentina and Brazil illegal. As
explained below, the WTO decision that the United States must obtain a
ruling from the WTO before imposing trade sanctions may help developing
countries.
3. WTO Deference to Local Legislation
While the United States has threatened to institute a formal suit
against Argentina in the WTO, it is unclear whether the decision making
body would necessarily impose sanctions against Argentina or force
Argentina to change its current IP laws. The India decision emphasized
several principals in the TRIPS Agreement deferring to the ability of
countries to adopt implementing legislation if "good faith efforts were
made." 248 The decision also supports the notion that TRIPS is truly
comprised of minimum IP standards and that the Appellate Body will not
function as a common law court and fill in any gaps left by the language of
246

See WTO Adopts Panel Findings Upholding Section 301, USTR Press Release, Jan.

27, 2000, availableat http:llwww.ustr.gov/releases/2000/01/0O-06.pdf.
247 White House 201 Decisions Under Attack, Kaye Scholer LLP International Trade
Update, February 22, 2000, availableat http://www.kayescholer.comlpodiumarticles/2000/
WhiteHouse_201.htrml.
248 See Reichman, supra note 97, at 450-51.
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the treaty. 249 The conjunction of the U.S. promise to refrain from Section
301 sanctions and the WTO position regarding implementing legislation
make it imperative for the United States to rethink its foreign policy toward
developing countries.
4. Outlook for the Future
Evidence of the benefits of a pro-competitive approach exists in
Argentina today. The amount of rhetoric regarding Argentina's treatment of
pharmaceutical patents draws attention away from other sectors of the
Argentine economy that also have serious IP violations. It is estimated that
0
"80 percent of all [software] programs purchased are illegally copied."5
Officials admit part of the problem is ignorance; many people don't realize
that such piracy is illegal, and as discussed earlier, part of the problem with
curbing violations is that Argentina did not extend IP protection for
software until the TRIPS Agreement.2 1 Realizing that the law alone will
not make a significant dent in the levels of piracy, over 300 domestic and
foreign companies are supporting a resolution, published in November of
1998, intended to reduce piracy. 2 The strategy involves two steps:
Realistically, the law will not eliminate
education and prosecution.
software piracy; the goal is to keep illegal purchases, which are estimated to
be thirty percent even in the United States, at a minimum.2 4 Officials
expect the law to produce an initial drop in illegal software purchases by
fifteen percent, while education and enforcement are expected to lower the
piracy rate another ten to fifteen percentage points.255
Private companies such as Microsoft have added additional support
to the reduction of piracy. Microsoft announced that it would invest
significantly in Argentina and build its technological base so Argentina can
become one of the top exporters in the southern hemisphere.2- 6 Companies
such as Microsoft and Unisys lose up to $1.8 billion annually to software
See id. at 447-49. Two questions remain after the India decision. First, will the
expiration of the transition periods for developing countries cause a flood of suits for nonviolatory complaints. Second, how will the WTO handle such complaints? Reichman
emphasizes that since "the tribunal took pains to link the bargained for expectations of
member countries" the provisions of TRIPS will still be interpreted strictly. See id. at 449.
250 Software Makers in Argentina Launch Campaignfor Compliance With Piracy Law,
249

PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), (DEc. 2, 1998), available in LEXIS,

News Library, BNA file.
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pirates and their situation bears many similarities to the U.S.
pharmaceutical manufacturers.757
In exchange for the transfer of
technology, Argentina has agreed to devote more resources to copyright
protection and enforcement.
Overall, the strategy of the software giants
seems to be making more progress through cooperation. 59 Indeed,
technology infusion into Argentina may be the carrot needed to strengthen
IP protection for pharmaceutical manufacturers. Former Secretary of
Commerce William Daley recently concluded a trip to Latin America to
discuss IP issues concurrently with negotiations to boost electronic
commerce in Argentina. 260 President De la Rua of Argentina stated,
"Argentina can and wants to be a production center for information
technology for software for the Latin American market and even for the
United States." 261 There is early evidence that such cooperative efforts are
working. During the February negotiations, Argentina agreed not to enact
legislation to renew the TRIPS transition period.
Argentina's
compromise should not be underestimated. During the WTO negotiations
in Seattle, WTO members were very close to allowing a three-year blanket
extension to developing countries to implement their TRIMS, TRIPS and
Custom Valuation obligations because of the transactional costs needed to
enforce the treaty provisions.26 3
IV. CONCLUSION

Implementing the TRIPS Agreement in developing countries will
reach a critical point after the Year 2000 deadline. Successful enforcement
will depend on structural, political and economic variables that will vary
from country to country. While the TRIPS Agreement has forced many
countries to make changes to their patent laws, the events in Argentina have
proved that the TRIPS Agreement is not the final answer or even a starting
point to strong IP protection. There are too many forces in Argentina and
in the TRIPS Agreement that are not solvable by sanctions or WTO panel
decisions. This does not mean that developing countries should be relieved
257See Baker & McKenzie, supra note 210.
258 Id.
259 Id.

260 Andrew Hay, Argentina Says US Trade Can't Be One-Way Street, Reuters Eng. News
Serv., Feb. 16,2000.
261 See id.

262 See id. In January eight developing countries, including Argentina, filed formal
requests with the WTO to extend their deadlines under the TRIPS Agreement. Argentina
originally sought to increase its transition period another seven years. See Daniel Pruzin,
Quad Group, Developing Countries Split Over Deadline Extensions, 17 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) No. 4, 143-44 (Jan. 27, 2000).
263 See id. at 143.
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from their obligations; rather it means that countries like the United States
need to look beyond the TRIPS provisions to get hard results.

